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STATE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE
CORPORATE DIVIDENDS: ANOTHER
CONQUEST OF THE EXPANDED
UNITARY BUSINESS DOCTRINE
States enjoy great latitude in their income taxation of multistate
and multinational businesses' because of congressional inaction2 and
Supreme Court forbearance.3 This latitude, however, has contrib-
1. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978). The Court has
interpreted the Constitution to give states wide latitude in their selection of apportion-
ment formulas. This interpretation is based in part on the Court's reluctance to favor
one formula over another-a determination that some may consider to be judicial
legislation outside the scope of the Court's delegated power. Id
2. J. Hellerstein, State Taxation Under the Commerce Clause: An Historical Per-
spective, 29 VAND. L. REv. 335 (1976). "Congress has plenary power under the com-
merce clause to regulate state taxation of interstate commerce, however, it has been
virtually unexercised." Change did not come about until 1959, after Justice Frank-
furter, in his dissenting opinion, pleaded for congressional action. See Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 470-77 (1959) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting), infra note 3, at 476-77. As a result of Justice Frankfurter's plea, and
requests from other judges and lobbyists, Congress passed Public Law 86-272,73 Stat.
555. This law is significant because it was the first legislative response to regulating
interstate commerce. Even though 86-272 placed a jurisdictional restriction on state
taxation, it was of little importance to the multistate-multinational businesses because
it affected only small merchandising businesses. J. Hellerstein, supra, at 339.
For a case interpretation of P.L. 86-272, see Smith v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Or.
50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965); cf Herf Jones v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Or. 404, 430 P.2d
998 (1967) (This case narrows considerably the application of P.L. 86-272); see gener-
ally J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, 339-44
(Cases and Materials 4th ed.); Hartman, "Solicitation" and "Delivery" under Public
Law 86-272: An Unchartered Course, 29 VAND. L. REv. 353 (1976) (contains a thor-
ough analysis of P.L. 86-272).
3. The Supreme Court's forbearance in the area of state taxation of multistate
businesses can be attributed to their philosophy that Congress must develop a solu-
tion to the problem. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, stated:
A determination of who is to get how much of the common fund can hardly be
made wisely and smoothly through the adjudicatory process. In fact, relying on
the courts to solve these problems only aggravates the difficulties and retards
proper solution.
At best, this Court can only act negatively. ... We cannot make a detailed
inquiry into the incidence of diverse economic burdens. . . . Neither can we
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uted to a lack of uniformity among state apportionment formulas.4
Moreover, constitutional5 and statutory jurisdictional requirements6
have compounded the diversity problem. To meet these require-
ments, states utilize the unitary business concept to tax income of an
integrated business only partially located within the state.7 The con-
cept proceeds on the basic premise that an integrated business as a
unit requires contributions from the unit's parts in varying degrees,
devise appropriate standards for dividing up national revenue on the basis of
more or less abstract principles of constitutional law ...
The problem calls for solution by devising a congressional policy. Congress
alone can provide for a full and thorough canvassing of the multitudinous and
intricate factors which compose the problem of the taxing freedom of the States
and the needed limits on such state taxing power.
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 476-77 (1959)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Corrigan & Dexter, States' Latitude in Taxingf Multistate Businesses, 11 URn.
LAW. 505, 509 (1979) (The Court intends to limit review of lower court decisions
involving state's tax matters); Powell, Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by
the Taxing Powers of the States, 32 HARV. L. REV. 634, 670 (1919) (discusses the
difficulties and limits placed on Court solution to the state taxing power problems).
4. See G. ALTMAN & F. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION
(2d ed. 1950); SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE,
H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (hereinafter cited as WILLIS REPORT)
(This report shows the diversity of state positions on taxation of intangible income
through allocation and apportionment); J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State
Tax Apportionment and the Circumscription of a Unitary Business, 21 NAT'L TAX J.
487 (1968) (Hellerstein suggests that the Court's policy will shift to take a more active
role in apportionment methods. Note from the discussion, infra, that Hellerstein's
projected changes never take place); Rudolph, State Taxation of Interstate Business,
the Unitary Business Concept and Affiliated Corporate Groups, 25 TAX. L. REV. 171
(1970) (includes an excellent case by case analysis of diverse positions taken by differ-
ent state courts and gives distinctions of formulary apportionment applied to various
businesses).
5. The due process clause places two restrictions on a state's taxing income de-
rived from interstate business. A "minimal connection" must exist between those ac-
tivities being taxed and the taxing state. National Bellas Hess v. Dept. of Rev., 386
U.S. 753, 756 (1967). In addition, a "rational relationship" must exist between the
income sought to be taxed and the taxpayer's activities in the taxing state. Norfolk &
Western Ry. v. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 325 (1968).
6. See notes 14, 18-19 infra.
7. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501, 506-08 (1942) (Income earned in
one state can be taxed by apportionment of another state so long as the in-state and
out-of-state activities that produced the income are part of one unitary business); f.
Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267,272-73 (1978) (a more extensive relationship
between the business and the taxing state must be shown before the latter can tax out-
of-state income).
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so that separate accounting of any part would result in an inaccurate
tax base. Accordingly, states use apportionment formulas to deter-
mine the percentage of unitary income attributable to their jurisdic-
tion." A major controversy concerning the application of these
formulas is the states' treatment of income from intangibles such as
dividends.'I The Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes of Vermont" held that the corporation's "foreign source"' 2
dividend income contributed to its integrated petroleum industry and
allowed Vermont to include that income in calculating the corpora-
tion's state income tax.13
8. See, ag., Boren, Separate Accounting in California and Uniformity in Apportion-
ing Corporate Income, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478, 532 (1971) (This author defines uni-
tary business as one in which all parts contribute to total profits in unmeasurable
amounts. To separate the profits of any portion of a unitary business from the rest
would leave a tax base which is inaccurate because no way exists to determine with
certainty the profits of any segment).
9. Apportionment of business income can be utilized by either separate account-
ing or formulary apportionment. Each has a different effect. Separate accounting
only computes an assessment on the business within the state. Formulary apportion-
ment computes the percentage of the business activity in the state as it relates to a
proportion of the whole unitary business. A single factor sales formula would com-
pute a corporation's taxable income much differently. For example: 4, a corpora-
tion, conducts a unitary business in which five states have retail stores. Each state
operation sells 20% of the total goods for sale. .4 realizes a profit of $1,000,000 on
total sales. For internal management reasons, the businesses in states X and Y pro-
duced deficits while the other three states earned the cumulative income. The busi-
ness in state X, utilizing separate accounting, shows no profit, and hence, no taxable
income. The business in state Y, utilizing a single factor formulary apportionment,
realized $200,000 in taxable income. (X's computation: 20% of 0 = 0; Y's computa-
tion: 20% of $1,000,000 = $200,000). Note the difficulties, given the facts above, if the
other three businesses are required to use formulary apportionment by their states:
only 80% of the total income will be assessed, leaving an inequitable benefit to the
state. Note also, the problem of over-taxation if the other three businesses are re-
quired by their states to apply separate accounting principles: 120% of the income
will be taxed.
10. For an analysis of the many alternative methods to taxation of intangibles and
a conclusion that full apportionment is the best method, see, e.g., Dexter, Taxation of
Income from Intangibles of Multistate-Multinational Corporations, 29 VAND. L. REV.
401, 408-11 (1970). See generally J. Hellerstein, The Unitary Business Princople and
Multicorporate Enterprises: An Examination of the Major Controversies, 28 TAX.
Exac. 313 (1975). With nearly $3 billion dollars in annual dividend income to mul-
tinational businesses, the states find this source to be an attractive revenue area. SeeCarlson, State Taxation of Corporate Income from Foreign Sources, EssAYs IN INT.
TAX. 284-301 (1976).
11. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
12. See note 26 infra.
13. 445 U.S. at 442-46.
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Vermont tax law apportions corporate net income "derived from
any trade, business or activity conducted within and without"' 4 Ver-
mont. Mobil, a multinational corporation domiciled in New York,
only sold petroleum products in Vermont wholesale and retail out-
lets.15 In its Vermont tax return, Mobil excluded "foreign source"
14. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 5833(a). Net income is defined:
for any taxable year and for any corporate taxpayer, the taxable income of the
taxpayer for that taxable year under the laws of the United States, excluding
income which under the laws of the United States is exempt from taxation by the
states.
Id. at § 5811(18).
Note, the Vermont statute makes no distinction for types of income. The inclusion
of dividend income is left to interpretation. To the extent a corporation petitions or
the commissioner requires modification under § 5833(b), dividend income may be
excluded or included in the state's apportionment formula to produce an equitable
result.
Vermont's three-part apportionment formula provides:
if the income of a taxable corporation is derived from any trade business or activ-
ity conducted both within and without this state, the amount of the corporation's
Vermont net income which shall be apportioned to this state, so as to allocate to
this state a fair and equitable portion of that income, shall be determined by
multiplying that Vermont net income by the arithmetic average of the following
factors: (1) The average of the value of all the real and tangible property within
this state (A) at the beginning of the taxable year and (B) at the end of the taxa-
ble year, expressed as a percentage of all such property both within and without
this state; (2) The total wages, salaries and other personal service compensation
paid during the taxable year to employees within this state, expressed as a per-
centage of all such compensation paid whether within or without this state;
(3) The gross sales, or charges for services performed, within this state, expressed
as a percentage of such sales or charges whether within or without this state.
If a corporation's net income has been determined as not fairly apportioned, the
State's tax commissioner is directed to absolve the problem through modification.
The pertinent statute provides in part: if the application of the provisions of this
section does not fairly represent the extent of the business activities of a corpora-
tion within this state, the corporation may petition for, or the commission may
require, with respect to all or any part of the corporation's business activity, if
reasonable: (1) Separate accounting; (2) The exclusion or modification of either
or both of the factors; (3) The inclusion of one or more additional factors which
will fairly represent the corporation's business activity in this state; (4) The em-
ployment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and appor-
tionment of the corporation's income.
Id at § 5833(a)(b).
15. The domestically incorporated affiliates and subsidiaries account for approxi-
mately 10% of Mobil's total dividend income. Mobil owns less than 10% of most
domestic subsidiaries. 445 U.S. at 457 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting). None of appel-
lant's subsidiaries or affiliates conduct business in Vermont, and appellant's share-
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dividend income.' 6 Disregarding Mobil's protest, the tax commis-
sioner required inclusion. 7 In response, Mobil filed suit attacking
the tax as violative of due process' 8 and commerce clause restrictions
on multiple taxation.' 9
holdings in those corporations are controlled and managed in New York City. Id at
428-29 & n.12.
Additionally, Mobil's activities in Vermont are confined to wholesale and retail
marketing of petroleum and related products. Mobil has no gas productivity or refin-
eries within the State. For a comprehensive example of Mobil's business activity in
Vermont, see 445 U.S. at appendix (A32, A46 and A60). For a summary, see id. at
458 n.12.
Much of Mobil's business abroad is conducted by wholly and partly owned subsidi-
aries and affiliates. It is important to note that 90% of Mobil's dividend income was
received from four subsidiaries incorporated abroad. Three of them, (Mobil Marine
Transportation, Ltd.; Mobil Oil Iraq with Limited Liability; and Pegasus Overseas
Limited), are wholly owned and one (ARAMCO) which produces the largest percent-
age of dividends attributes only 10% ownership to Mobil. Id at appendix (Exhibit 8,
Appellant's Source of Dividend Income Schedule).
16. Id at 430; see 445 U.S. at appendix (Exhibit 1-3, Vermont Income Tax Return
for 1970-72). Mobil argued that the inclusion of the dividend income in the tax base
is inconsistent with the statute since the result would not be "fair" and "equitable" as
required by the Vermont statute. Id at 432.
17. Id at 432-33. Vermont's tax commissioner restored the "nonapportionable"
items to the preapportionment tax base and recalculated Mobil's liability to be
$76,418.77. Id at 432.
18. 445 U.S. at 436. Mobil contended that Vermont apportionment violated due
process because there was an insufficient nexus between their activities in the state
and the foreign activities that produced the dividends. Ad "Nexus" is used syno-
nomously with "minimal connection" and "vital link". There must be sufficient ac-
tivity in a state to meet the jurisdictional "nexus" requirement. International Shoe v.
Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
19. 445 U.S. at 436. Mobil alleged that the tax imposed a burden on interstate
commerce by subjecting Mobil's dividend income to a risk of multiple taxation. Since
New York, the state of commercial domicile, has the power to tax dividend income
without apportionment, allowing Vermont also to tax the income creates a substantial
risk of double taxation. Id It is unclear from past cases whether the burden of proof
is satisfied by the plaintiff's showing a substantial risk exists or whether actual multi-
ple taxation must be shown. See Standard Pressed Steel v. Dept. of Rev. of Wash.,
419 U.S. 560, 563 (1975) (a gross receipts tax on a business was upheld by the Court
because the taxpayer failed to show a risk of multiple taxation); cf. Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co., v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 463 (1959) (the Court indi-
cates that the taxpayer must show that a burden on interstate commerce exists). The
Court rejected the commerce clause challenge. Although conceding the possibility of
multiple taxation existed, the Court maintained that no burden on interstate com-
merce existed because New York did not tax the dividend income. 445 U.S. at 442.
Mobil also contended that the Vermont tax violated the Interstate and Foreign
Commerce clauses of the Constitution and that Vermont allocation rules created a
risk of multiple taxation of the same income. Id Furthermore, Mobil suggests that
1981]
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Ignoring Mobil's substantive due process challenge, the Supreme
Court held on procedural grounds that Mobil failed to meet its bur-
den of proving that Vermont's tax was extraterritorial.2" In reaching
its decision, the Court recognized the inherent complexities in the
multinational corporate structure and the consequential difficulty
only the state of commercial domicile or the State of the "business situs" should be
allowed to tax foreign source dividends under recent case precedent. 1d at 444. See
Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
The National Tax Association in 1922 developed the traditional approach to taxa-
tion of dividend income by the state of commercial domicile. Its report stated: "[Div-
idends) form no part of the trading profit and do not need to be apportioned by
formula since they can readily be specifically allocated to their proper sources." Re-
port of Nat' Tax 4ss'n Coma on Apportlionment Between States of Taxes on Mercan-
tile and Manufacturing Business, Proceedings, 15 N.T.A. 198 (1922). For an example
of a case supporting this approach see Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193, 208-
10 (1936).
The Supreme Court, in dicta, strongly departed from the traditional approach of
allocating foreign dividends to the state of commercial domicile and moved toward a
position allowing apportionment as well. 445 U.S. at 445.
We find no adequate justification, however, for such a preference. Although a
fictionalized situs for intangible property sometimes has been invoked to avoid
multiple taxation of ownership, there is nothing talismanic about the concepts of
'business situs' or 'commercial domicile' that automatically renders those con-
cepts applicable when taxation of income from intangibles is at issue. The Court
has observed that the maxim mobilia sequunter personam, upon which these
fictions of situs are based, 'states a rule without disclosing the reasons for it.'
First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minn., 301 U.S. 234, 241 (1937). The Court also has
recognized that 'the reason for a single place of taxation no longer obtains' when
the taxpayer's activities with respect to the intangible property involve relations
with more than one jurisdiction. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 367, 59 S.
Ct. 900, 906, 83 L.Ed. 1339 (1939).
Id
Some cases indicate that the traditional approach of allocation of dividend income
to the state of commercial domicile exclusively has been abandoned. See, e.g., Stan-
dard Oil v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382, 384 (1952). For support of an equally strong contrary
position, see generally Hellerstein, supra note 10.
20. 100 S. Ct. at 1234. Mobil attempted to meet its burden by showing that its
foreign activities were separate and distinct from its petroleum industry. Such a
showing would have contradicted the allegation that Mobil's foreign source income
was unitary and hence not apportionable by states that had minimum contacts only
with the integrated petroleum industry. The Court determined that transforming the
same dividend income into legally separate entities, foreign or otherwise, does not
change the economic realities of unitary business and therefore should not affect the
apportionability of income the parent receives. Id at 441.
See also Norfolk & Western Ry. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682, 688 (1968)
(Where a taxpayer attacks an apportionment formula, he carries the distinct burden
of showing by 'clear and cogent evidence' that it results in extra-territorial values
being taxed).
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states have in establishing jurisdiction over a fair proportion of taxa-
ble income earned by the corporation.2' Accordingly, it adopted the
concept that "the linchpin of apportionability in the field of state in-
come taxation is the unitary business principle."22 Emphasizing that
Mobil's foreign investment dividends contributed to its integrated pe-
troleum industry,23 the Court upheld the tax commissioner's inclu-
sion of the dividends in Vermont's apportionment formula.24
Initially, the due process clause prohibited states from taxing in-
come arising from business conducted outside the state.25 The uni-
tary business concept arose from the necessity for states to meet
jurisdictional requirements conditioning taxation of income from
business activities extending beyond their respective borders.2 6 The
21. 445 U.s. at 438.
22. Id at 439. In the Court's discussion of the correct method of assessment to
use in determining the income of a unitary business, they note:
separate accounting, while it purports to isolate portions of income received in
various states, may fail to account for contributions to income resulting from
functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale.
Because these factors of profitability arise from the operation of the business as a
whole, it becomes misleading to characterize the income of the business as hav-
ing a single identifiable source.
Id at 438. Contra Garrison, Toward a Consensus on Apportionable vs. Allocable In-
come, 28 TAX EXEC. 41, 60-61 (1975) (Presents a list of many strong policy arguments
which militate against apportionment of dividend income by formulary apportion-
ment. Some of the arguments include: overtaxation results when the state of com-
mercial domicile requires allocation while other states require full apportionment;
dividend income has very little nexus with a non-domiciliary state in which only sales
are conducted; courts have recognized in many cases that the state of commercial
domicile has power to tax corporate dividend income).
23. The oil and gas industry is made up of non-integrated and integrated compa-
nies. The two differ because non-integrated companies engage only in production
and sell their crude oil at the wellhead while integrated oil companies engage in pro-
duction, refining and marketing. See Rudolph, supra note 4 at 187.
24. 445 U.S. at 442.
25. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment prevents states from tax-
ing a person outside their jurisdiction as well as a person or business which has an
insufficient relationship to the state. See International Harvester Co. v. Dept. of
Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 352-57 (1944).
26. The origin of the unitary business concept can be traced back to early railroad
cases involving "rolling stock". A businessman in Pennsylvania owned several rail-
road cars that were contracted for use. Pennsylvania imposed a tax on the percentage
of income attributable to the state by determining the ratio of miles traveled in the
state to those traveled outside. This assessment was known as the "unit rule" since
the entire ownership of rolling stock was included. Pullman's Palace Car v. Penn-
sylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891). Thus it was the Court's recognition of the use of busi-
ness property for a single purpose that gave rise to the "unit" classification.
1981]
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first major application of formulary apportionment to net income of
an integrated business occurred in Underwood Typewriter v. Chamber-
lain.27 In Underwood, Connecticut taxed a corporation that earned
income through a "series of transactions" beginning with manufac-
turing in the state and ending with sales outside.2" The Court recog-
nized the difficulty in determining a state's fair proportion of taxable
income by looking only to instate manufacturing operations. 29 Con-
sequently, the Court allowed apportionment of the integrated busi-
ness income.30 The Court implied that even though apportionment is
a rough approximation, its purpose is to attribute a fair proportion of
profits to the taxing state.3 Additionally, the Court held that the
method of apportionment will be valid unless the facts show that the
formula is inherently arbitrary, or that its application produces an
unreasonable result.32
Bass Ratcliv. State Tax Commissioner3 3 extended the Underwood
rationale by allowing inclusion of "foreign source" 34 income into the
27. 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
28. Id at 120-21.
29. Id
30. Id Connecticut employed a single factor formula using property as a basis.
The Court computed the proportion of value of instate real and tangible personal
property to value of out-of-state property owned by the corporation to determine the
fair share of income attributable to the state. This method was appropriate in these
circumstances since the product was manufactured in Connecticut and sold out-of-
state. Id
31. Id at 119-21. The Court's attitude on this issue remains unchanged today.
See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1978) (The apportionment
formulas are not applied to identify any income from specific sources, rather, they are
to be used as a rough approximation of income attributable to the taxing jurisdiction).
32. 254 U.S. at 118-19. The facts show that profits amounted to $1,336,586. The
fair cash value of real estate and tangible personal property in Connecticut was
$2,977,827 and the fair cash value of the property outside the state was $3,343,155.
The proportion of instate to out-of-state property was 47%. Even though the taxpayer
showed that 3% of the income was attributable to Connecticut, the Court allowed the
apportionment since the business was a unit. This case shows that it takes more than
an indication of unreasonableness to invalidate a formula. Id Cf. Maxwell v. Kent-
Coffey Mfg., 204 N.C. 365, 168 S.E. 397 (1933); Annot., 90 A.L.R. 476 (1933) (North
Carolina applied a single-factor apportionment formula to a Delaware corporation
doing business in the state. The Court upheld the formula which taxed 99.2% of the
corporation's entire income because 99.2% of the businesses' property was in the state.
The result, however, is extremely arbitrary because only .002% of the business sales
were attributable to North Carolina).
33. 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
34. In this context, foreign source refers to income produced outside the United
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apportionment formula base.35 In Bass, a British corporation brewed
ale in England but sold it in New York.36 Because the profits de-
pended on each part of the "series of transactions," the Court con-
cluded the business was unitary.37 Consequently, New York could
properly tax a fair proportion of the profit.3 8 In Bass, the formula
ratio has independent significance because it includes in the denomi-
nator all property factors that contribute to producing both the tangi-
ble income as well as the intangible dividend income.39 Otherwise,
the presence of the dividend income in the numerator without its cor-
responding property factor in the denominator would have had the
inequitable effect of taxing gross dividend income.40 Bass, coupled
with Underwood, indicates a trend that state formulary apportion-
ment will prevail when applied to unitary businesses.
Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina,4' the first case in which a tax-
payer successfully contested a state apportionment formula,42 de-
States. The income may be either tangible, in the form of real and personal property,
or intangible, in the form of capital gains, rents, and dividends.
The WILLIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1148-50, recommends that foreign source
income should not be taxed by federal or state governments, unless a corporation
doing business in the taxing state also has income from foreign sources. This report
also recommends that the assessment be made by apportionment. Id. at 1144.
35. 266 U.S. at 282.
36, Id at 278-79.
37. Id This is the first time the unitary business doctrine is used. Although the
term is not used in Underwood, it is apparent from the similar rationales used by the
courts that the business in Underwood was also unitary. In fact, the Court sustained
the tax in Bass, only after they cited Underwood for support. Id
38. Id at 278-80. Despite the fact that separate accounting indicated a loss in
New York, the Court held that to get the "true value" of income, from a unitary
business, apportionment must be allowed. Id
9. Id at 277-80.
40. The justification for inclusion of the foreign property in the tax base of the
apportionment formula is evident. By including the income without the factors that
produced the income in the tax formula, the effect is taxation of gross profits of the
business by a net profit standard. Compare the WILLIS REPORT, supra note 4, at 1155
(does not require inclusion of the foreign factors in the states' apportionment formu-
las. The reason for not requiring the inclusion may be attributable to the feeling that
because states can modify their apportionment formulas, they will naturally do so to
produce an equitable result), with I.R.C. § 243, (the federal government allows for-
eign tax credits to offset its inclusion of foreign source income into the federal income
tax base).
41. 283 U.S. 123 (1931).
42, In the history of Supreme Court decisions, taxpayers have not had great suc-
cess in contesting state apportionment formulas. Some of the successful cases are
1981]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
parted from this trend. The Court conceded that, under the unitary
doctrine, the amount of income attributable to each state should de-
pend on the extent of business activities in that state.43 Since the tax-
payer proved by strong evidence that the apportionment formula
produced an unreasonable result,44 the Court invalidated the formula
and allowed a separate accounting of the income produced in the
state.45
Butler Brothers v. McColgan,46 though inconsistent with Hans Rees'
Sons, neither overruled nor qualified it. The Butler Brothers Court
determined that once a business has been classified as unitary, a tax-
payer may not contest the reasonableness of a particular apportion-
ment formula by separate accounting.47 For the first time, however,
the Supreme Court adopted a test to determine if a business is uni-
tary.4s The Court used a three factor test: unity of ownership, unity
Colonial Pipeline v. Traigle 421 U.S. 100 (1975); Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Dept.
of Rev. of Wash., 419 U.S. 560 (1975); Norfolk & West. Ry. v. North Carolina, 297
U.S. 436 (1964); Memphis Gas v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948); Hans Rees' v. North
Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931). This result is probably attributable to the taxpayer's
difficult burden of proof. See notes 20 and 32 supra.
43. 283 U.S. at 134. The Court determined that, as a matter of Constitutional law,
a state cannot tax income which is "in no just sense attributable to transactions within
its jurisdiction." Id
Due process requires that a state have more than a jurisdictional nexus with the
business; an additional requirement is that there must be a rational relationship be-
tween the state and the activity taxed. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954);
see also note 5 supra.
44. 283 U.S. at 135. Evidence introduced indicated that 17% of the average in-
come had its source within North Carolina and the state's assessment allocated 85% of
the income. Id Cf. note 32 supra (more than an indication of unreasonableness is
needed to invalidate a formula.)
45. 283 U.S. at 135.
46. 315 U.S. 501 (1942).
47. Id at 508-09. The taxpayer's proposed separate accounting for their Califor-
nia branch. Under this method, no tax would have been assessed since the calcula-
tions would indicate a loss. Under California's formulary apportionment, however,
California would receive 8% of the corporation's nationwide income. Id
48. Id The California Supreme Court established the test. Butler Bros. v. Mc-
Colgan, 17 Cal. 2d 664, 111 P.2d 334 (1941), afd, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). California
applied a three factor apportionment formula utilizing property, sales, and payroll.
The Court recognized these factors show "the relative contribution of the activities in
the various states to the production of the total unitary income." Id at 508. This
three factor formula is the most common today and is known as the Massachusetts
Formula. For a description of the formula, see, e.g., Developments in the Law, Federal
Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate Business, 75 HARv. L. Rav. 953, 1011
(1962).
[Vol. 22:229
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol22/iss1/7
STATE TAXATION
of operation, and use of a centralized executive force.4 9 In Butler
Brothers, seven mercantile business entities located in seven states
conducted their business exclusively within each state." The Court
considered them unitary because each entity contributed financially
to the maintenance of a "centralized management" division that pro-
vided sales advantages for each of the separate entities.5 Neverthe-
less, after Butler Brothers, the Supreme Court left the states unguided
in developing the unitary business concept from the single test estab-
lished. 2 Following the contradicting interpretations in Hans Rees'
Sons and Butler Brothers, it remained unclear when to consider a
business unitary and apply apportionment, and when instead to al-
low separate accounting.
States have manipulated the unitary business doctrine and modi-
fied taxing methods to serve their individual revenue needs.5 3 Conse-
quently, wide diversity in the division of taxes has created risks of
49. 315 U.S. at 508-09. The three unities test was applied in other cases. See, e.g.,
John Deere v. Franchise Tax Board, 38 Cal. 2d 214, 229, 238 P.2d 569, 577 (1951).
Many commentators criticize the three unities test because of its inherent ambiguities.
The factors of the test give no significance to the difference between a business con-
ducted instate and one conducted out-of-state. See, e.g., Keesling & Warren, The
Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HAST. L.J. 42, 45-48 (1960).
50. 315 U.S. at 504-505.
51. The business entity located in California, showed a loss on its income tax
return, computed by separate accounting. The California business, along with the
other six, sent payments to Chicago for maintaining a central management division
which handled management of the sales. It has been argued that in cases such as
these, involving mercantile operations, separate accounting would be a more feasible
assessment. Rudolph, supra note 4, at 182; cf. Developmentsin the Law-Federal Limita-
tions on State Taxation of Interstate Business, supra note 48 at 1015 (the note indicates
this was a proper decision. Even though one entity may have to operate at a loss, the
other profiting entities have received the economic benefit of bulk purchases, contrib-
uted to in part from the losing entities joint purchase. Additionally, elements such as
goodwill and efficiency received from centralized management cannot be accurately
determined through separate accounting).
Butler was a major extention of the unitary business principle as previously estab-
lished. Bass and Underwood derive their unity only from operational interdepen-
dence through a "series of transactions", while Butler derives its unity from economic
interdependence of the centralized management.
52. See Boren, supra note 8, at 490-94 (discusses the development of the three
unities test along with some modifications made by the California courts. The "de-
pendency test" was added in Edison Cal. Stores v. McColgan, 30 Cal. 2d 472, 183
P.2d 16 (1947). The "necessary and essential" test was added in Superior Oil Co. v.
Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal. Rpt. 545 (1963)).
53. See notes 62-65 and accompanying text infra.
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both multiple taxation 54 and under taxation.55 Attempts to provide
uniform and reasonable methods for allocating and apportioning the
income of multistate businesses have had limited success.16 Accord-
54. With no uniformity among the states, the various taxation methods applied
have the potential effect of overlapping, resulting in multiple taxation of the business.
There are, theoretically, five basis in which business dividend income can be taxed by
states, they include the following: (1) state of legal domicile; (2) state of commercial
domicile; (3) state in which stock is located; (4) all states the business receives in-
come from (by apportionment); (5) all states which have conferred benefits on the
business. Therefore, if states exercised each basis of taxation, the same business divi-
dend income could be taxed five times. One argument employed by taxpayers is that
the intangible investment income has already been taxed by the payor subsidiary, and
to tax it again would indicate multiple taxation and hence, a burden on interstate
commerce. Furthermore, the elusive nature of intangibles, result in the difficulty of
states to trace the intangible to some "source" within the state. Dexter, supra note 10,
at 402, 403 and 404.
55. Several reasons support the possibility of undertaxation. Because intangible
investments require very little business activity, taxpayers have successfully argued
that the business activity in the taxing state is insufficient to overcome existing juris-
dictional requirements. Id at 403, 404.
56. Attempting to provide a uniform and reasonable method for allocating and
apportioning the income of multistate businesses, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association, approved the Uniform Division of Income for State Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA) on July 1, 1957. 7 UNIFORM L. ANN. 365 (1970). For a
discussion on the uniform act's basic features by the drafter of the act, see Pierce, The
Uniform Division ofIncomefor State Tax Purposes, 35 TAXES 10 (1957). The uniform
act deals with the allocation and apportionment of income of multistate businesses.
The drafters designed the act for those states that tax net income by calculation for-
mulas. For a text of the uniform act, see 35 TAXES 631 (1957).
Initially, few states adopted the uniform regulations proposed by the UDITPA. In
1959, two years after the UDITPA had been approved by the National Conference of
Commissioners on State Laws, Alaska was the only state that had adopted the act.
Hartman, State Taxation of Corporate Incomefrom a Multistate Business, 12 VAND. L.
REV. 21, 58 (1959).
This attitude changed, however, when federal intervention became imminent. Leg-
islative concern for uniformity arose after the Willis Committee completed its study.
The WILLIS REPORT found great diversity in state taxation practices. WILLIS RE-
PORT, supra note 4, at 1143. The committee's proposal was incorporated into the
Interstate Tax Bill. Interstate Taxation Bill, H.R. REP. No. 11798, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966). The WILLIS REPORT radically departed from prevailing practices by
proposing one of many extreme remedies to state diversity: the full apportionment of
all income from multistate businesses. Full apportionment of all income was to re-
place the various methods of division used by states. Although the Bill failed, the fear
it wrought induced formation of the Multistate Tax Compact (MTC), a confederation
of twenty-one states created primarily to block enactment of federal legislation on the
interstate tax problem.
The MTC's stated purpose is to promote uniformity and compatibility in state tax
systems. MTC is composed of one representative from each participating state. They
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ing to one scholar, the major impediment to success is the mixed sen-
timent toward uniformity among taxpayers and state tax officials
alike; some members of both camps consider the existing diversity
advantageous.57 For example, states have enjoyed greater freedom to
tax as a natural result of the lack of uniformity.5 8
States have evaded traditional jurisdictional requirements without
violating constitutional protections.5 9 Recently, states have expanded
the unitary business principle as a means to lift jurisdictional bound-
aries,60 further enabling them to tax previously untapped revenue.6'
propose advisory regulations concerning intangible property assessments. Participat-
ing states have authorized the MTC to conduct joint audits of multinational busi-
nesses when participating states request them. For a text of the MTC agreement, see
Dexter, supra note 9, at 402, 403. The MTC's authority to audit businesses was con-
tested as a violation of the Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution (Art. I § 10).
The Supreme Court upheld the MTC's authority. See United States Steel v. Multi-
state Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
States feared that federal intervention would infringe upon state sovereignty and
that exclusive application of formulary apportionment to all income would inade-
quately account for those states with special relationships to businesses. States were
particularly concerned with this portion of the Interstate Tax Act that would disre-
gard sales factors in the apportionment. States used many methods to determine re-
ceipts included in the numerator of the state's receipt factor. Hellerstein lists these
methods as follows: "(I) the sales activity test which allowed taxation of sales income
where the business has sales employees; (2) the sales office negotiation test, attributed
sales as taxable income to the state where the negotiation transpired; (3) the origin
test allocated income from sales to the state where the goods were shipped from;
(4) the destination test which is the most popular, allows receipt of sales to be taxed
by the state in which the customer receives the goods." See J. HELLERSTEIN & W.
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 3, at 459.
57. Boren, Specc Allocation of Corporate Income in Calfornia. Some Problems
ia the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes, 30 TAx. L. REv. 607 (1975)
(presents a thorough analysis of the problems of the UDITPA, and offers some solu-
tions. One problem is the conflicting interpretation of the act by taxing authorities).
58. See, e.g., Honolulu Oil v. Franchise Tax Board, 60 Cal. 2d 417, 386 P.2d 40,
34 Cal. Rpt. 552 (1963) (States wanting to maximize their revenues have disregarded
traditional UDITPA requirements and allowed the taxation of income arising from
nonoperational activities).
59. See notes 18-19 supra.
60. See Superior Oil v. Franchise Tax Bd., 60 Cal. 2d 406, 386 P.2d 33, 34 Cal.
Rpt. 545 (1963) (expanded unitary business principle to include non-operational func-
tions of a non-integrated business). Contra Skelly Oil v. Comm'n of Taxes, 269 Minn.
351, 131 N.W.2d 632 (1964) (an integrated oil company carrying on operating func-
tions in a state was held to be nonunitary).
Commentators argue that these cases present two extremes in defining the contours
of the unitary business principle. J. Hellerstein, Recent Developments in State Tax
Apportionment and the Circumscription of Unitary Business, 21 NAT. TAX. J. 487, 497-
503 (1968).
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An example of this expansion occurred in Woolwort v. Director of
Taxes,62 in which the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the state to
include in its tax base foreign source dividend income from a non-
domiciliary corporation.6" The court held that no federal constitu-
tional barrier to state taxation of foreign source dividend income
existed if the business was unitary." The court emphasized that the
Woolworth subsidiaries were "wholly owned" and carried on the
"same business in the same way" as the parent corporation.65
In Mobil, the Court indicated that because the appellant multina-
tional corporation maintains an integrated petroleum industry,6 6 all
of its subsidiaries and investments are naturally a part of and contrib-
ute to the unitary business.67 The Mobil Court, like the New Jersey
61. See note 19 supra.
62. 45 N.J. 466, 213 A.2d 1 (1965). Other examples of this expansion have also
been recognized. See, e.g., Gulf Oil v. Morrison, 120 Vt. 324, 141 A.2d 671 (1958)
(the court held that dividend income was subject to apportionment as either business
income or as part of the unitary income of the payee corporation).
63. 45 N.J. at 500, 213 A.2d at 20.
64. 45 N.J. at 494, 213 A.2d at 16-17.
65. Id at 482-86, 213 A.2d at 10-12. Woolworth's multinational business includes
approximately 3,500 stores in the United States and foreign countries. All of the busi-
nesses were retail merchandise stores. The Woolworth Court emphasized unity of
business activity as much as unity of ownership.
Woolworth, like Bass, accounted for foreign investments in the denominator of the
formula. Woolworth sought to exclude the investment income dividends and interest,
from the income tax base applied by New Jersey. The court recognized the formula
as being a distortion of the true income realized. The income and value of the invest-
ments were included in the numerator of the apportionment formula but the out-of-
state property, payroll and receipts that created these values, were not in the appor-
tionment factors. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for proper amendments.
The court recommended that the director of taxation should have used his discretion-
ary authority to grant relief under the inadequate statute which provided the formula.
Id at 491, 213 A.2d at 15.
66. Courts have recognized that integrated petroleum industries, because of their
large size and concentration of goals toward production, refining, and sales, appear on
their face to be unitary. The industry, however, has often segregated its income at the
production end from sales because posted field prices for crude oil allow for maximiz-
ing profits. See generally, Magnolia Petroleum v. Oklahoma, Tax Comm'n, 190 Okla.
172, 121 P.2d 1008 (1942).
67. Contrary to the Court's holding that Mobil's investment income along with its
operational income is all part of a unitary business, Mobil argues and supports with
facts that its investments are "separate". 445 U.S. at 440. See, e.g., Keesling and
Warren, The Unitary Concept in the Allocation of Income, 12 HASTINGS L.J. 42, 43-48
(1960) (Distinguishes "separate" from "unitary" business. A separate business is one
conducted wholly within a particular taxing jurisdiction that utilizes separate ac-
counting only to take into account income from property within the borders. A uni-
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Supreme Court, expanded the unitary business doctrine to overcome
jurisdictional barriers on state taxation. Mobil's foreign source divi-
dend income serves as investment income rather than operational in-
come.6" Even though Vermont's connection with Mobil arose from
Mobil's operations, the investment income was included in Ver-
mont's net income assessment.69 Consequently, the Mobil Court's
holding establishes a new rule. The constitutionally required mini-
mal connection for taxation purposes70 now need only exist between
the state and the unitary business generally.7 ' Moreover, the state no
longer must show a "rational relationship" between the income taxed
and the purported instate activity.7 2
Having established jurisdiction, the Court followed the Underwood
rationale by allowing apportionment despite its recognized impreci-
sion.73 By virtue of its holding, the Court acknowledged the near
impossibility of achieving an accurate apportionment for complex
multinational businesses. I Vermont law requires, however, that
tary business has inseparable portions of its business that is carried on within and
without the taxing jurisdiction. The necessity of dealing with the business as a unit by
taking into account income from property and activities outside of the jurisdiction as
well as within gives rise to its classification. The multistate business is able to change
from separate to unitary with no apparent change in the nature of the business. These
commentators also suggest that the foregoing analysis of the distinction between sepa-
rate and unitary businesses differs sharply from much of the previous thinking on the
subject. Id
68. 445 U.S. at 435-36, 455-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting). One of the most substan-
tial controversies in state taxation of dividends concerns how dividends are produced
in the course of business activity. For example, if a manufacturing company receives
dividends from a wholly owned subsidiary engaged in selling the product of the par-
ent corporation, the dividends would be realized as operating income from the uni-
tary business. If the affiliate were not an integral part of the unitary enterprise, a
different result should prevail. Such income, as an investment, does not flow from the
operating activities of the unitary business. Hence, the traditional rule under the
UDITPA that income from intangibles not realized in the course of business opera-
tions should be allocated to the domiciliary is undoubtedly sound and should take
precedent. See generally J. Hellerstein, supra note 10. See also, Pierce, supra note 56.
69. 445 U.S. at 435-36, 455-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
70. See note 5 supra.
71. See notes 5 and 18 supra.
72. See note 43 supra See also note 5 supra.
73. See note 31 supra.
74. Id See also, International Harvestor Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422 (1947)
(The Supreme Court, "has long realized the practical impossibility of a state's achiev-
ing a perfect apportionment of expansive, complex business activities. . . and has
declared that 'rough approximation rather than precision' is sufficient.").
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even if the unfairness does not reach unconstitutional proportions,
the tax commissioner must consider adjustments in the formula to
alleviate obvious inequities.75 To maintain a degree of fairness and
equity in determining a proper formula, the tax commissioner should
be obliged to research possible adjustments requested by the tax-
payer.76 If the commissioner allows no adjustment, he should present
sound reasons supporting this conclusion.
The Supreme Court's analysis of Mobil mistakenly begins with the
premise that Mobil, its affiliates, and its subsidiaries comprise a uni-
tary business.7 7 The Court places minimal consideration on the
traditional relationships between business entities that precedent re-
quired to establish unity. The Court could have easily reached the
conclusion that it did, had it not deemphasized a "series of transac-
75. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Director of Taxation, 213 A.2d 1, 18, 19 (1965). See
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 5833(b) which provides that "if a corporation's net income
has been determined as not fairly apportioned, the State's tax commissioner is directed
to absolve theproblem through modjcation . . . the corporation may petition for,.
(4) The employment of any other method to effectuate an equitable allocation and
apportionment of the corporation's income. (emphasis added). In Mobil, the tax-
payer petitioned for a modification allowed by the Vermont statute. Mobil's petition
included a request for a "combined method" of apportionment. 445 U.S. at 459 n.15.
The petition was rejected by the commissioner and disregarded by the Court. Com-
mentators suggest that "combined" apportionment could solve the division of divi-
dend income problem. Intercorporate dividends are deducted from taxation while the
foreign source investments are included in the denominator of the formula. This will
obviously lead to an equitable result because no matter where the dividends are lo-
cated or what they are used for, after transfer within the corporation to their final
destination, the taxing jurisdiction will assess the dividends, provided sales income is
included in the base. In effect, the dividend income reaches the taxing state, rather
than the taxing state reaching the dividends. Consequently the combination method
coupled with full apportionment would provide an equitable result in taxation for
both state and business alike. See generally Dexter, supra note 4, at 420-21.
76. Id Legislatures must necessarily intend that a formula not only be constitu-
tional but also equitable. A recent decision has indicated the importance of fairness
in apportionment methods. General Motors v. Dist. of Columbia, 380 U.S. 553, 561
(1965) ("to ensure that the methods used display a modicum of reasonable relation to
corporate activities within the state."). See also notes 49-51 supra.
77. 445 U.S. at 455-57. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens indicates that the
majority, under its definition of unitary business, assumes the justification of Ver-
mont's assessment of Mobirs income. The majority's use of the unitary business prin-
ciple encompasses not only the operations of the taxpayer but also the operations of
all affiliates that are directly or indirectly engaged in the petroleum business. Stevens
supports his position by indicating, "a large number of the corporations in which
Mobil has small minority interests and from which it derived significant dividend
income would seem either to be engaged in the petroleum business nor to have any
connection whatsoever with Mobil's marketing business in Vermont." Id. at 460.
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tions",78 "centralized management",79 or, as the New Jersey Supreme
Court enunciated, "ownership and same business activities as the
parent". ° None of the relationships among Mobil, its affiliates, and
its investments appear sufficient to establish unity. The only activity
involved was the receipt of dividends, and the only management ac-
tivity involved was accounting for the dividend income after its re-
ceipt. 1 Furthermore, appellant owns less than ten percent of many
of the domestic and foreign affiliates from which Mobil received for-
eign dividend income. 2 Some of these affiliates conduct businesses
totally unrelated to the petroleum industry. 3
The Court imposes a burden of proof virtually impossible to meet.
Earlier decisions exemplify this difficulty.84 Nevertheless, those deci-
sions indicate simplicity of proof compared to that required in Mobil.
The early businesses were relatively small, employed simple book-
keeping, and applied single factor formulas to tangible property. In
contrast, Mobil is an extremely large corporation with intricate book-
keeping, and is required to apply a complex formula85 to intangible
property. 86 The corporation comingles investment income with oper-
ational income, and utilizes the combined income for the business
generally. At this point, investment income loses its identity of origin
and can not be traced. 7 In view of this traditional managerial prac-
78. See Bass Ratcliff v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924); Underwood
Typewriter v. Chamberlin, 254 U.S. 113 (1920) (Courts held "series of transactions"
established unity).
79. See Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 315 U.S. 501 (1942). (Concentrating on the
centralized management facts of the "three unities" test, the court looked to the eco-
nomic interdependency of the business to establish unity.).
80. See Woolworth v. Director of Taxes, 45 N.J. 466, 213 A.2d 1 (1965) ("owner-
ship and same business" establish unity).
81. 445 U.S. at 455-57 and 456-57 nn.9 & 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id
83. Id See also note 18 supra and 89 infra (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a list of
Mobil's subsidiaries and affiliates, and a discussion of their unrelated nature, see 445
U.S. at 455-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. See notes 32 and 42 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 14 supra.
86. See Montgomery Ward v. Comm'n of Taxation, 276 Minn. 479, 483-84, 151
N.W. 2d 294, 296-97 (1967) (Discusses the extreme difficulty in accounting for intan-
gible property because often it is set aside as a reserve for further expansion, rein-
vested in its own business or other business. Given the nature of the income, tracing
it for taxation purposes is extremely burdensome if not impossible).
87. See note 54 supra.
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tice, a "clear and cogent showing of an arbitrary result" constitutes a
nearly impossible burden of proof.
To avoid the "linchpin of apportionability," Mobil would have to
keep its investment proceeds separate from the businesses operational
funds. A requirement of this nature would unreasonably restrain
Mobil's management. After all, the dividends have already been
earned through investments and have established an identity as in-
vestment income. To simply consider them related to the operation
of the integrated business and subject to apportionment because they
are subsequently used in business operations stretches the imagina-
tion."8 Only one theory can justify this conclusion: that the purpose
of producing any income whatsoever is for use in the business gener-
ally. Thus, all income becomes unitary business income regardless of
investment or operation.
Unquestionably then, the denominator of the apportionment
formula applied must take into account the factors contributing to
the realization of "all" the unitary income. Vermont, however, did
not include in the denominator of the formula investment factors that
produced the dividend income.
Both Bass and Woolworth have emphasized the importance of this
inclusion. Without it, the apportionment formula would greatly
overstate Mobil's taxable income in Vermont. 9 Either the Supreme
Court should require the Vermont tax commissioner to modify the
formula or the tax, or the results should be deemed arbitrary and
unlawful under established doctrine.
The Court in Mobil made a cursory attempt at solving a compre-
hensive problem and obviously deferred to congressional action.90
The Supreme Court could have pursued a more respectable approach
by fostering a narrow, workable standard giving state courts and leg-
88. See note 67 supra.
89. In opposition to the majority decision, Justice Stevens argues that there was
no unitary business and even if established, the apportionment formula produced an
arbitrary result. Justice Stevens shows that the apportionment formula leads to an
arbitrary result: "But of greatest importance, the record contains no information
about the payrolls, sales or property values connected with the production of income
by the payor corporations are added to the denominator of the apportionment
formula, the inclusion of earnings attributable to those corporations in the apportion-
able tax base will inevitably cause Mobil's Vermont income to be overstated." 445
U.S. at 460-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. The Court's traditional "hands otr' policy on state taxation results from the
Court's philosophy that Congress should resolve any existing problems. See notes 2
and 3 supra.
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islatures a cogent direction for future development of the unitary
business doctrine.9' Instead, the Court expands the doctrine to the
derogation of any attempts toward uniformity.92 As a result, states
remain free to exercise great latitude in their income taxation of mul-
tistate and multinational businesses.
Barry Dean Jennings
91. One approach offered by a respected authority is the utilization of an objective
rather than subjective test by requiring degrees of operational interdependence before
a business would be considered unitary. This test leaves little room for diversity of
application and would result in a more uniform approach. See J. Hellerstein, supra
note 10, at 324; for an example of an additional method, see note 5 supra.
92. See note 56 supra. The expansion of the unitary business doctrine to the ex-
tremes reached in Mobil no longer addresses the original purpose for the doctrine's
development, to allow states a fair means to establish jurisdiction to tax that which is
reasonably attributable to them. States have had a history of diversity in taxation
practices caused by an ambiguous test established in Butler. Recently, the states have
moved toward more uniform guidelines under the UDITPA, only to be suppressed by
the Court is nullifying the essential dividend classification. The importance of this
classification is explained in note 68 supra.
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